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RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS
APPEAL

AND

ERROR-DETERMINATION

AND

DISPOSITION

OF

CAUSE-

WHETHER, UPON APPEAL, A REVIEWING COURT MUST TTEAT THE JUDGMENT
AS A UNIT OR MAY REVERSE AS TO ONE PARTY WHILE AFFIRMING AS TO

ANOTHnER-The question as to whether or not a reviewing court may reverse a judgment as to one but affirm as to another defendant appears to
have recurred in the recent case of Chmielewski v. Marich.1 The plaintiff
there brought his action under the Dram Shop Act 2 for an assault which
took place in a certain tavern. Joined as defendants in the suit were the
tavern proprietor, the owners of the premises occupied by the tavern,
and the two assailants who became intoxicated there. Although served
with process, none of these defendants filed appearance and, in due time,
a default judgment was entered against all except one, as to whom no
order of disposition was made. Three of the judgment defendants, after
term time, filed petitions for relief in the nature of a writ of error coram
nobis3 and, upon hearing the default judgment was vacated as to all defendants. On appeal taken by plaintiff to the Appellate Court for the
First District,4 that court, after determining that one of the appellees was
a minor who had not previously been represented by a guardian ad litem,
found that the order vacating the judgment as to him should be affirmed,
but could find no adequate basis for the order as to the other appellees. 5
It was then faced with a question as to whether or not it could affirm a
judgment order as to one while reversing as to another, which question
the court resolved in the affirmative.
Prior to the adoption of the Civil Practice Act, 6 Illinois courts followed the common law practice, which required that a verdict or judgment against several tort feasors had to be treated as a unit,7 but Section
92 of the statute was undoubtedly enacted to obviate the binding effect
of this common law rule.8 Since then, Illinois courts have interpreted that
section to mean, in effect, that under proper circumstances a reviewing
court may affirm the judgment as to some at the same time it reverses as
1350 Ill. App. 379, 113 N. E. (2d) 69 (1953). Leave to appeal has been granted.
2 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 135.
3 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 196.
4 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 201, treats an order granting a new trial as being final
for purpose of appeal.
5 These parties had claimed that they should not be held accountable for the
failure of their insurance agent, after prompt notice of suit, to undertake the
defense in their behalf. The court, on the basis of the holding in Wagner v. Sulka,
336 II. App. 101, 82 N. E. (2d) 922 (1948), held the negligence of the insurance
agent was imputable to the defendants and that they were guilty of a lack of
diligence.
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 125 et seq., became effective on January 1,
1934.
7 LIvak v. Chicago & Erie R. R. Co., 299 Ill. 218, 132 N. E. 524 (1921).
s I1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 216.
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as to other defendants. 9 It must be kept in mind, however, that this
power not to treat the judgment as a unit does not extend to the trial court °
for there is no authority, under Section 50 of the Civil Practice Act, to
permit the setting aside of a part of a unit judgment." NWhile not entirely
new, the instant case serves to emphasize the distinctions existing between
earlier cases concerning the setting aside of judgments.

APPEAL AND ERROR -

RECORD AND PROCEEDINas NOT IN RECORD

-

WHETHER OR NOT ERRONEOUS APPROVAL OF A TRIAL COURT ORDER MAY BE

rather significant
issue pertaining to civil procedure was featured in the recent case of Kelly
v. Winkler.' After twice having had his cause of action in tort dismissed
for want of prosecution, plaintiff there was successful in obtaining a default judgment against the defendant. On proceedings in the nature of
a writ of error coram nobis to vacate this default judgment, 2 the defendant
urged that leave should be given to answer inasmuch as defendant, after
the prior dismissals, had not been personally served with notice of plaintiff's motions to reinstate the cause. The plaintiff's attorney then endorsed an order sustaining the defendant's motion and granting a new
trial with an "O.K. for plaintiff," but appealed from this order to the
Appellate Court for the First District.3 The defendant then summarily
moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground the order so approved by
plaintiff was a consent order, from which no appeal could be taken. On
oral argument on such motion, the plaintiff's attorney insisted that his
endorsement of the order was as to form only and that he did not intend
to waive the right of appeal. The court, dismissing the appeal, held that,
if amendment was necessitated to qualify the approval given to the court
order, or to modify the record in that respect, the amendment had to be
made in the trial court before the appeal had been taken.
CORRECTED BY AMENDMENT IN THE REVIEWING CoURT--A

In reaching this conclusion, the court found it necessary to ascertain
the effect which should be given to the approval of a trial court order,
without qualification as to form or substance, by an endorsement initialed
"O.K." by the attorney. It concluded that such an order would amount
9 Crane v. Railway Express Agency, 369 Ill. 110, 15 N. E. (2d) 866 (1938);
Minnis v. Friend, 360 Ill. 328, 196 N. E. 191 (1935) ; Zahn v. Muscarello, 336 Ill.
App. 188, 82 N. E. (2d) 504 (1948).
10 See Gray v. First National Bank of Chicago, 388 Ill. 124, 57 N. E. (2d) 363
(1944) ; Fredrich v. Wolf, 383 Ill. 638, 50 N. E. (2d) 755 (1943).
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 174(7). Contrast the authority there
given to set aside "any judgment" with the authority given, in Section 174(1), to
issue writs of execution upon "one or more judgments rendered in the same cause."
1 351 II. App. 145, 114 N. E. (2d) 335 (1953). Leave to appeal has been denied.
2 I1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 196.
3 Interlocutory appeals from orders on motions granting new trials are authorized
by I1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 201.
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to a consent judgment.4 To accomplish that result, it had to discard a
policy which it had previously followed, evidenced in the case of People
ex rel. Edelman v. Hunter,' to the effect that the written approval endorsed
on a decree, provided the decree was one embracing an actual decision by
the trial court, could not be construed to represent an agreement by the
parties, hence the right of appeal would be reserved in such cases.' The
decision in the instant case, in this respect, would make possible a uniform
treatment of the problem, and would tend to reduce further ambiguity,
even though it formulates a more restrictive rule. Hereafter, one desiring
to retain a right to appeal should not give unqualified approval to trial
court orders through use of an "O.K." endorsement but should clearly
note that the approval is as to form only.
Perhaps more important is the emphasis placed by the court on its
refusal to permit amendment of the record in the reviewing court. While
Section 92 of the Civil Practice Act purports to authorize a reviewing
tribunal to exercise "any and all of the powers of amendment" belonging
to trial courts 7 it has been noted that, certainly as to the several appellate
courts, such courts possess appellate jurisdiction only s hence the court
appears to have acted correctly in this regard. While the decision may
appear to be harsh, it emphasizes the fact that review is to be had on the
record as presented. If there is occasion to correct errors or to amend
pleadings, such correction must occur in the trial court, before judgment
has been rendered and appeal has been taken, 9 at least as long as present
constitutional provisions remain in effect.

AUTOMOBILES-INJURIES FROM OPERATION, OR USE OF HIGHWAYWHETHER A PERSON LEAVING VEHICLE FOR TEMPORARY PURPOSE BEFORE
TRIP IS COMPLETED LosES STATUS AS GuEs--The case of Tallios v. Tallios'
4 It has been uniformly held that, as a true consent judgment represents an
independent agreement of the parties and is not really the judgment of the trial
court, no appeal may be taken therefrom: First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Whitlock,
327 Il. App. 127, 63 N. E. (2d) 659 (1945). It has also been held that approval
of a court decree, as manifested by an attorney's "O.K.," amounts to a consent
judgment: City of Kankakee v. Lang, 323 Ill. App. 14, 54 N. E. (2d) 605 (1944).
5 350 Ill. App. 75, 111 N. E. (2d) 906 (1953).
6 See also McDavid v. Fiscar, 342 Ill. App. 673, 97 N. E. (2d) 587 (1951), noted
in 29 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW REVIEw 357.
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 216(1) (a).

8 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 32. The case of Leffers v. Hayes, 327 Ill. App. 440, 64
N. E. (2d) 768 (1946), appears to have permitted amendment of a complaint, in
the reviewing court, so as to make the same conform to the proofs, but see comment
thereon in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvrzw 262.
9 Bollaert v. Kankakee Tile & Brick Co., 317 Ill. App. 120, 45 N. E. (2d) 506
(1942), noted in 21 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvIzw 244. See also Salitan v. Neff Feed
Co., 351 Ill. App. 127, 114 N. E. (2d) 320 (1953),

where a motion to amend the

complaint to conform to the proofs was denied In the reviewing tribunal.
1350 Il. App. 299, 112 N. E. (2d) 723 (1953). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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returned to the Illinois Appellate Court 2 but this time the question concerned the correctness of a trial court ruling to the effect that the wife in
question was a guest in the employer's truck at the time the injury was
sustained.3 The facts disclosed that the plaintiff had accompanied her
husband in a truck owned by the defendant but driven by the husband
on certain business errands for the defendant. On the way home, the
wife discovered that she did not have her purse and could not readily find
it in the truck. After the husband stopped the vehicle, the wife opened
the door, backed out of the seat, felt under it for the purse and, while her
left foot was on the pavement and her right foot on the running board,
the truck suddenly shot forward and knocked her down. The trial court
struck all allegations of negligence, ruling as a matter of law that the
plaintiff was a guest, and confined the proof to acts of wilful, wanton and
malicious character, on which basis the jury found the defendant not
guilty. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the Illinois "guest" statute
was inapplicable, 4 but the Appellate Court held otherwise notwithstanding
the fact that, at the time, the plaintiff was not in the cab of the truck.
As no prior Illinois case had produced a construction of the statute
in relation to analogous facts, the court was forced to rest its decision
upon what it considered the legislative intention to be. Adopting a liberal interpretation for the phrase "riding in a motor vehicle," it declared
that the relation of host and guest begins when the guest attempts to enter
the auto and ends only when he has alighted at the end of the ride. This
relation, the court said, is not interrupted by any usual and customary acts
performed as an incident to the normal courtesy shown to a guest. It
might be noted, however, that the court made no reference to the Wisconsin
case of Rohr v. Employers Liability Assurance Corporation,Ltd.,5 which
dealt with the application of the same Illinois statute to a somewhat similar
fact situation. The driver and the plaintiff there concerned were driving
along an Illinois highway when a tire went flat. Both got out of the car.
The driver began working a bumper jack while the plaintiff stood alongside. The jack slipped off the bumper and the car suddenly rolled backward and struck the plaintiff. With no discussion of the problem and
with the apparent acquiescence of the defendant, the court concluded that
the plaintiff was not a guest because he was not riding "in" the car when
injured. 6 The case is probably one of doubtful persuasion, but the con2A prior appeal, noted at 345 Ill. App. 387, 103 N. E. (2d) 507 (1952), had
decided that a wife could sue her husband's employer for a negligent tort committed by the husband-servant.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 95/, § 58a, restricts the cause of action of a
"person riding in a motor vehicle as a guest" to acts of wilful and wanton misconduct on the part of the driver. Italics added.
4 In the absence of a statute, the common law would have imposed liability on
the defendant for the negligence of the driver: Denton v. Midwest Dairy Products
Corp., 284 Il. App. 279, 1 N. E. (2d) 807 (1936).
5243 Wis. 113, 9 N. W. (2d) 627 (1943).
6 See also note on the case of Vest v. Kramer, 158 Ohio St. 78, 107 N. E. (2d)
105 (1952), In 31 CmAoo-KENT LAW REviEw 151, particularly p. 152, note 3.
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duct of stopping to fix a flat tire could easily come within the broad definition given in the language used in the instant case.
To further bolster its conclusion, the Illinois court also stated that
the beginning and end of the host-guest relationship was not unlike the
beginning and end of the relationship between a carrier and a passenger
for hire in a public conveyance, wherein it has been held that the relationship would not be interrupted by a temporary absence from the conveyance for a reasonable and useful purpose. Again, it is interesting to
note that the Ohio case of Eshelman v. Wilson7 rejected an attempt to
apply this same rule to an automobile guest situation, the court there
saying that the extension of the relationship of a passenger to a zone
beyond the common carrier itself had been brought about because of the
fact of payment by the passenger for his transportation. While there
is a degree of variance in the wording of the several "guest" statutes, so
as to make a decision in one jurisdiction of little value as precedent in
another, 8 these two cases offer enough to generate a question as to whether
the court concerned with the instant case correctly ascertained the legislative intention.

COURTS-CONCURRENT AND CONFLICTING JURISDICTION, AND COMITYDIVORCE COURT OVER MINOR IS AF-

WHETHER CUSTODIAL JURISDICTION OF

FECTED BY ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION BY JUVENILE COURT-In

the recent

case of People ex rel. Homghland v. Leonard,' the Illinois Supreme Court
was confronted with an original petition for habeas corpus prosecuted by
the mother on behalf of a minor who was held in custody by the superintendent of the Illinois Training School for Boys under a warrant of commitment issued by an appropriate Illinois county court pursuant to proceedings based on the Juvenile Court Act.2 By virtue thereof, rights to
custody and guardianship, previously awarded to petitioner under a divorce decree rendered by a competent Illinois circuit court, were nullified.
Petitioner claimed, among other things, that the continuing jurisdiction
of the circuit court over the minor's custody, incident to the divorce
decree, 3 precluded a subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by a county
court, but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, and remanded the
minor to the custody of the superintendent, when it held that the prior
7 83 Ohio App. 395, 80 N. E. (2d) 803 (1948). The defendant there had transported plaintiff to a social gathering. Before beginning the return trip, plaintiff
entered the automobile but alighted when the defendant could not find his keys.
Plaintiff was standing about two feet from the car when it suddenly moved and
struck him. Held: the plaintiff was not "in or upon said motor vehicle," hence not
under the Ohio guest statute.
8 Compare the holdings in Castle v. McKeown, 327 Mich. 518, 42 N. W. (2d) 733
(1950); Eshelman v. Wilson, 83 Ohio App. 395, 80 N. E. (2d) 80.3 (1948); and
Prager v. Isreal, 15 Cal. (2d) 89, 98 P. (2d) 729 (1940).
1415 Ill. 135, 112 N. E. (2d) 697 (1953).
2 Ii. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 23, § 190 et seq.
3 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 19.
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and continuing jurisdiction of the circuit court, stemming from the original
divorce decree, did not operate to prevent the county court from also
assuming jurisdiction over the minor under delinquency proceedings.
The Supreme Court, in arriving at this conclusion, recognized that
the problem presented was one of first impression in Illinois, although it
inferentially recognized the general rule to be that, when two courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the same right between the same parties,
once jurisdiction of one court has attached, the other court would be
without right to proceed to the same end.4 Nevertheless, the court appears
to have adopted the position it did on the ground that such principle
was inapplicable in the instant case principally because the doctrine applies
with respect to the enforcement of the same right whereas the right sought
to be enforced by the juvenile court was not precisely the same as the one
previously considered by the divorce court. In that connection, the court
noted that proceedings before the juvenile court may be initiated on behalf of the public generally5 in the interest of the right of the state, as
parens patriae, to prevent the delinquency and destitution of its children
as a class, 6 whereas the divorce court exercises its jurisdiction to enforce
the full measure of the duty owed by the parent in the maintenance, support, and education of the particular child.
While no criticism can be addressed to either the reasoning followed
or the result attained, the decision, in adhering to the majority view on
the point,7 has apparently nullified earlier Illinois decisions which, in
full accord with the minority view, 8 have intimated that any modification
of custody arrangements ought to come from the court wherein the earlier
decree was rendered. 9 The decision, in that respect, may also be said to
be a step in the direction of integrating the policy and purposes revealed
in the new Youth Commission Act recently adopted in this state.' 0
EMINENT DOMAIN-PRoCEEDINGS TO TAKE PROPERTY AND ASSESS COMPENSATION-WHETHER

STATE

HAs

RIGHT

To

JURY

TRIAL

IN

EMINENT

DOMAIN PROCEEDINs--In the recent case of Department of Pulhic Works
Aquelino v. City of Waukegan, 344 IlI. App. 204, 100 N. E. (2d) 820 (1951).
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 23, § 193, indicates that any "reputable person,
being a resident of the county," may initiate proceedings based thereon.
6The case of Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328, 100 N. E. 892 (1913), contains an
excellent discussion of the purposes underlying the statute.
7 See annotation in 78 A. L. R. 317.
8 State ex rel. Emory v. Porterfield, 211 Mo. App. 499, 244 S. W. 966 (1922), sets
out the minority position on the point.
9 See, for example, People ex rel. Hanawalt v. Small, 237 Ill. 169, 86 N. E. 733
(1908) ; People ex rel. Burr v. Fahey, 230 II. App. 143 (1923).
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 23, § 220d.1 et seq. Section 2 thereof describes
the general purpose to be one designed "to conserve the human resources represented
by the youth of the State . . . by providing methods of training . . . [for] young
4

persons found delinquent or guilty of crime. . .

."

Section 9 directs the newly-

created Youth Commission to receive persons committed to it pursuant to Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 23, § 190 et seq., being the statute involved in the instant ase.
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and Buildings v. Kirkendall,' the state agency, acting under the authority
of the Illinois Freeways Act, 2 sought to condemn certain premises for an
improvement on a state road. One of the defendants filed an answer to
which was attached a lease.3 Petitioner's motion to strike the answer and
the lease, and another motion for ascertainment of compensation by a jury,
were denied. The trial court, after hearing the evidence without a jury,
ascertained compensation in the defendant's favor. On direct appeal by
petitioner,4 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the denial of jury trial
did not constitute an abuse of judicial discretion inasmuch as the state
constitution did not guarantee to the state a right to jury trial in such
cases.
The law is well settled that the constitutional right to a jury trial
does not necessarily extend to proceedings based upon an exercise of the
right of eminent domain. 5 Two basic reasons support this principle. One,
at common law, eminent domain proceedings were not encompassed within
the term "common law actions," hence did not fall within the area in
which the constitutional guarantee as to jury trial operates. 6 Second, it
early became quite common practice to fix the compensation to be paid for
property taken through the use of other agencies than the common-law
jury. 7 Prior theory and practice appears to have been well known to the
framers of the present Illinois constitution when, in 1870, they provided
that, whenever private property was taken for public use, the compensation to be paid should be ascertained by a jury.8 They did, however, include a brief exception with respect to those cases wherein compensation
was to be made by the state, and it was this exception which formed the
basis for the instant decision.
Cases decided since 1870, wherein eminent domain proceedings have
been conducted by lesser organs of the state, have recognized a right to
trial by jury if demanded by the property owner 9 and not waived.' 0
These cases, however, have left unsettled the question whether, when the
1415 Inl. 214, 112 N. E. (2d) 611 (1953).
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 121, § 334 et seq.
3 The defendant in question had, in good faith, secured a lease prior to the filing
of the petition. He urged that this fact should be considered in determining the
fair market value of the land. The Supreme Court held that the lease was admissible in evidence, it being material to the question of valuation.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199.
5 Johnson v. Joliet & Chicago R. Co., 23 Ill. 124 (1859) ; Ross v. Irving, 14 Ill. 171
(1852).
2

6 United States v. Kenesaw Mountain Battlefield Ass'n, 99 F. (2d) 830 (1938);
United States v. 204.85 Acres of Land, 49 F. Supp. 20 (1943); United States v.
Alexander, 47 F. Supp. 900 (1942).
7 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain, § 337. Historical treatment of the subject is also
furnished in the opinion in Rich v. City of Chicago, 59 Ill. 286 (1871).
8 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 13. The language thereof is substantially repeated in
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 47, § 1.
9 Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Spring Creek Drainage Dist., 215 Ill. 501, 74 N. E. 696

(1995).
10 Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Hock, 118 111. 587, 9 N. E. 205 (1886).
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state itself acted, a jury trial was essential. In view of the holding in
Johnson v. Joliet & Chicago Railroad Company," to the effect that eminent
domain proceedings are neither ex contractu nor ex delicto in character,
and in the absence of any express constitutional or statutory language
12
requiring trial by jury where the state itself seeks to take property, it
can only be believed that the holding in the instant case, novel as it may
be, is the correct one. It would seem to follow that, when the state sues,
the private owner is likewise to be denied a right to trial by jury, much as
he may desire to have the services of one. The defect in law would appear
to be one which calls for legislative consideration.
INJUNCTIONS--ACTIONS

CURACY

IN VERIFICATION

FOR INJUNCTIONS-WHETHER TECHNICAL

OF PLEADING IS PREREQUISITE

AC-

TO INJUNCTIVE

RIEF---In the recent case of Callahan v. Holsman,' the plaintiff secured
a temporary injunction designed to restrain the defendants, holders of a
second mortgage trust deed, from foreclosing thereon. A motion to dissolve, made by defendants, having been denied, an appeal was taken to
the Appellate Court for the First District. 2 That court reversed when
the judges unanimously agreed that the complaint failed to state a prima
facie case for final relief, but they disagreed over the point as to whether
or not the complaint was adequately verified. Following the customary
form, plaintiff had attached an affidavit to the complaint to the effect that
the facts stated therein were true "except for such facts as are stated
on information and belief," and that, as to these, the plaintiff verily believed them to be true. The appellants contended the affidavit was deficient because the words "to be" had been omitted after the word "stated"
in the quoted phrase, so it was not possible to determine which facts were
absolutely verified and which ones only qualifiedly so. Despite this, the
majority of the court treated the affidavit as being sufficient, believing the
law to have outgrown that primitive state of formalism wherein the
precise word was the sovereign talisman and every slip was fatal.$
In reaching the conclusion that the affidavit was sufficient, the court
deviated from the strict rule enunciated in the case of Board of Trade v.
Riordan,4 where it had been held that the necessary allegations in a bill
1123 Ill. 124 (1859).
12 See Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Gorbe, 409 Ill. 211, 98 N. E.
(2d) 730 (1951), noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvIEw 142, which held Ill. Laws
1947, p. 905, unconstitutional. That statute, designed to permit a quick taking of
property at the instance of the state, made no provision for jury trial to determine
the adequacy of the sum tendered or deposited.
1 351 Ill. App. 1, 113 N. E. (2d) 483 (1953). Robson, P. J., specially concurring,
agreed that the complaint did not state a prima facie case, but refused to concur
in the conclusion that the verification of the complaint was adequate.
2 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 202, authorizes an appeal from interlocutory orders concerning injunctions.
3 This view was expressed by Judge Cardozo in Wood v. Lady Duff-Gordon, 222
N. Y. 88, 118 N. E. 214 (1917).
4 94 Ill. App. 298 (1900).
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for injunction had to be verified positively, and achieved a liberal result
in reliance upon the Supreme Court holding in the case of Hulse v. Nash,5
wherein an affidavit qualified "as to matters therein set forth on information and belief" was deemed to be sufficient. The later Supreme Court
holding in Smiley v. Lenane,6 an election contest matter, however, seems
to have withdrawn from any departure from the highly technical principle
advanced in previous decisions, wherein affidavits had been criticized on7
the ground that a prosecution for perjury could not be assigned on them,
for the court there re-emphasized the perjury element.
On this last point, the Appellate Court concerned with the instant
case spoke lightly of the perjury aspect by referring to the fact that no
member of the court had ever heard of a perjury prosecution based upon
an affidavit attached to a civil complaint of the kind before it. While
this might be so, it had been held, in Wright v. Depositors State Bank,s
that an affidavit to a petition for an injunction to the effect that the petition was true "except as to such matters as are therein alleged to be upon
information and belief," which matters were believed to be true, was
insufficient to support an injunction because perjury could not have been
assigned thereon. 9 While continued adherence to a highly technical rule
which might prove to be a snare and a pitfall for unwary members of
the bar would not be desirable, it is questionable whether a deviation
therefrom should be tolerated in those situations, emergency or otherwise,
where an affidavit is required by express mandate of the legislature.

INJUNCTIONS INTERLOCUTORY
AND
INJUNCTIONS - PRELIMINARY
WHETHER OR NOT FAILURE OF CORPORATION TO JOIN WITH ITS DIRECTORS IN
SUCCESSFUL APPEAL TO DISSOLVE TEMPORARY INJUNCTION BARS CORPORA-

TION FROM RECOVERY OF DAMAGEs--The Appellate Court for the First

District in the case of Kolin v. Leitch,1 was recently asked to determine
whether a corporate party which had not joined in an appeal to dissolve
an interlocutory temporary injunction could offer a suggestion for damages
arising from the improper issuance thereof. The case was one in which
5 332 Ill. 500, 163 N. E. 792 (1928).
6363 Ill. 66, 1 N. E. (2d) 213 (1936).
7 There would seem to be tacit recognition given therein to the holding in Will v.
City of Zion, 225 Ill. App. 179 (1922), to the effect that a bill of complaint should be
verified as to its material parts, thereby distinguishing positive allegations from
those stated on information and belief.
8 268 Ill. App. 478 (1932).
9 See also Fox v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, Inc., 349 Ill. App. 132, 110 N. E. (2d)
84 (1953), where it was indicated that the rule as to verification of pleadings for
injunctions would be applied to requests for the appointment of temporary receivers.
The affidavit there concerned contained an exception "with respect to the allegations
which are on information and belief."
1351 Ill. App. 66, 113 N. E. (2d) 806 (1953). For earlier aspects of the case,
see 343 Ill. App. 622, 99 N. E. (2d) 685 (1951).
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the plaintiff originally sought to enjoin the board of directors of a private
school corporation from closing its doors. After temporary injunction
had been issued against the members of the board, and their motion to
dissolve the same had been denied, the school corporation was added as a
party defendant. On interlocutory appeal, 2 the board of directors secured
reversal of the temporary injunction. The school corporation, which had
not been a party to the motion to dissolve or to the appeal from the
denial thereof, thereupon filed a written suggestion of damages,3 claiming
to be the party damnified. Plaintiff opposed the suggestion on the ground
the corporation as such, had not sought dissolution of the temporary injunction, but the trial court nevertheless assessed damages in favor of the
school. On appeal therefrom, the Appellate Court affirmed, holding that
the corporation was the person damnified by the issuance of the injunction, and the failure to include it as an appellant in the appeal taken by
its board of directors did not operate to bar relief.
While the case is not the first in which a party not enjoined has been
held entitled to recover damages under a statutory suggestion with respect
thereto,4 the earlier cases were ones in which the damnified party had
joined in the motion to dissolve the injunction and had, thereby, laid
the predicate for a claim for damages. In contrast thereto, it was held,
in Ridgley v. Minneapolis Threshing Machine Company,5 that a party who
did not join in a motion to dissolve would not be entitled to seek summary
damages but would be left to recover them, if at all, in a separate action
on the injunction bond. 6 The apparently contradictory result attained
in the instant case, one in which the corporation had not been directly
enjoined nor had participated in the motion to dissolve, seems to have
turned on the fact that the corporation was said to be represented by its
directors who, in their management of the corporation, 7 were supposed, in
their representative capacity, to be acting in its behalf. The case, then,
would seem to create an exception to the general rule previously followed.
In that connection, it should be noted that the representative capacity in
which the directors acted played an important part in the decision, so it
is unlikely that this exception will again be extended to cover cases wherein
one defendant, not so represented, and who has not joined in a motion to
dissolve, will have the benefit of action taken by a co-defendant. Such a
person will, in all probability, be left to his remedy in a suit on the
injunction bond.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 202.
Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 69, § 12.
4 See Hunt v. Pronger, 126 Ill. App. 403 (1906), wherein the motion to dissolve
was granted by the trial court, and School Directors of Dist. No. 181 v. Mathis,
168 Ill. App. 174 (1912).
5 61 Ill. App. 173 (1895). See also Leonard v. Pearce, 271 Ill. App. 428 (1933).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 69, § 12, indicates that a failure to assess dam2
3

ages shall not operate to bar an action on the bond given pursuant to Section 9
thereof.
7 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.33.
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MASTER AND SERVANT-MASTER'S LIABILATY FOR INJURIES TO SERVANT
-WHETHER
OR NOT EMPLOYEE, INJURED WHILE VIOLATING FEDERAL
CRIMINAL STATUTE, MAY MAINTAIN ACTION FOR INJURY AGAINST EMPLOYER

-An interesting question was presented to the Appellate Court for the
First District through the case of Bonnier v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Railroad Company.1 The plaintiff there involved was jarred, during switching operations, from his position atop a standing gondola car consigned to
an out-of-state consignee. Plaintiff, employed as a yard blacksmith by the
defendant carrier, was then in the process of removing a piece of scrap
metal from the consigned shipment without authority or direction from
the employer and, apparently, was acting in violation of a federal statute
making it unlawful to take, possess, or carry away any article moving in
interstate commerce. 2 In plaintiff's suit to recover for personal injuries
so sustained, the trial court overruled defendant's motion for a directed
verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and entered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal therefrom, the Appellate Court reversed
the judgment, with direction to enter judgment in favor of the defendant,
on the ground that plaintiff's unlawful act in going upon the car and
taking property belonging to a third person justified the dismissal of his
action.
The law is well settled that courts will not enforce a civil cause of
action founded, in whole or in part, upon the doing of an act which is
against public policy or in violation of law.3 On the basis of this doctrine,
it has been held that a contract is unenforcible if any part of, or the whole
of, the consideration is illegal 4 or if plaintiff's own unlawful act has concurred with that of the defendant in causing the injury of which he
complains.5 For that matter, where the plaintiff is himself guilty of the
violation of a penal statute, he has been denied the right to recover from
the defendant for harm caused by the same, or a similar, violation.6 It
would seem, therefore, that any extension of these previous decisions to a
case in which the plaintiff alone was acting in violation of law at the time
of his injury should occasion no great surprise.
It is interesting to note, however, that the court emphasized the fact that
the result in question was reached without taking into consideration the
defendant's conduct and its participation, or the absence thereof, in the
harm inflicted on plaintiff.7 Carried to its logical conclusion, the case
1351 fI1. App. 34, 113 N. E. (2d) 615 (1c3).
2 See 18 U. S. C. A. § 659.
3 Gilmore v. Fuller, 198 Ill. 130, 65 N. E. 84 (1902).
4 Crichifleld v. Bermudez Asphalt Paving Co., 174 Ill. 466, 51 N. E. 552 (1898).
5 Newton v. The Illinois Coal Co., 316 I1. 416, 147 N. E. 465 (1925).
6 Harris v. Hatfield, 71 Ill. 298 (1874).
7 The case would indicate the presence of serious injury. At the first trial thereof,
a verdict fixed plaintiff's damages at $183,333.33. On new trial, a verdict of $70,000
was reached and judgment was rendered thereon. The record does tend to show,
however, an absence of negligence on the part of the employer.
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would seem to support the view that, whenever a plaintiff is engaging in
unlawful conduct, no matter how minor in character or remote in operative effect, the defendant is to be absolved from liability without any
attention being given to the gravity of the defendant's wrong. It is easy
to say that two wrongs should never make one right, but the humane spirit
which conceived the doctrine of comparative negligence8 most certainly
would revolt before accepting a conclusion that drastic.
WITNESSES-COMPETENCY-WHETHER
TION TO ADVERSE

CLAIMANT'S

OR NOT ESTATE WAIVES OBJEC-

COMPETENCY BY

TAKING CLAIMANT'S PRE-

DISCOVERY DEPOSITION-The claimant involved in the recent case of
Pink v. Dempsey1 presented a claim against an estate based on an oral
contract with the deceased under which it was alleged that the deceased
TRIAL

had promised to leave a will giving claimant all of his property in return
for certain personal services which, claimant alleged, she had performed.
Having failed to establish her claim in the probate court, claimant then
appealed to a court of general jurisdiction where statutory trial de novo
was granted.2 Prior to a hearing before that court, the legal representative of the estate took claimant's pre-trial discovery deposition regarding
all phases of her claim, 3 but this deposition was neither filed nor placed
in evidence at the trial. At the ensuing trial, claimant was held to be
disqualified as a witness, 4 despite claimant's contention that the right to
object to her testimony had been waived by the taking of her pre-trial
discovery deposition, and judgment was entered on the verdict against her.
Upon appeal therefrom, the Appellate Court for the First District affirmed

the decision, holding that the estate had not waived the disqualification of
claimant as a witness by taking her pre-trial discovery deposition.
Although the precise problem involved in the instant case had not
previously been passed upon in Illinois, some cases regarding the subject
of examination and competency of witnesses5 had arisen in connection

with the operation of Section 60 of the Civil Practice Act. 6 These cases,
interpreting the phrase "called as a witness" to refer to the direct eliciting
of testimony at the trial of a cause, may be said to have laid the founda-

tion for the present decision.

Noting that the taking of a claimant's

8 See Turk, "Comparative Negligence on the March," 28 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
RmIEw 189 (1950).
1350 Ill. App. 405, 113 N. E. (2d) 334 (1953). Leave to appeal has been denied.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, §§ 484 and 487.
3 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 182(2), provides for pre-trial discovery by deposition.
See also Rule 19 of the Illinois Supreme Court.
4 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 51, § 2, preserves the familiar "dead man" rule as to qualification of adverse parties.
5 Smith v. Billings, 177 Ill. 446, 53 N. E. 81 (1899) ; Winger v. Chicago City Bank
& Trust Co., 325 Ill. App. 459, 60 N. E. (2d) 560 (1945) ; Chapman v. Bruton, Inc.,
325 Il. App. 334, 60 N. E. (2d) 125 (1945), abst. opinion.
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 184, authorizes the calling of any party as
a witness, at the instance of the other party, upon the trial of any cause.
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deposition would not amount to the same thing as a taking of testimony
from a witness appearing at the trial of a cause, for the deposition would
not become evidence until presented as such at the ensuing trial, the court
concluded that no waiver of the disqualification had occurred by the mere
act of securing pre-trial discovery. In that connection, it preferred the view
that the waiver would not come into existence until some testimonial benefit
was obtained at the trial in preference to the view, noted elsewhere, that
a waiver of objection to competency, if made at one stage of a case,
operates as a waiver with respect to all later stages. 7 As the primary
purpose of pre-trial discovery appears to be one designed to encourage
exploration of the opponent's claims and to avoid surprise, any other
holding would place a barrier in the way of a full utilization of reformed
procedural methods.

7 See McClenahan v. Keyes, 188 Cal. 574, 206 P. 454 (1922); Barrett v. Cady,
78 N. H. 60, 96 A. 325 (1915).

